

























Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford, UKMUWOThe Mus im World0027-4909© 006 Hartford SeminaryApril 2006963
 
RIGINAL ARTICLE














ver since the crushing victory of the formerly Islamists’ Justice and 
Development Party (
 
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi
 
-AKP) in the 
November 2002 general elections, discussions on Turkish political life 
revolves around two main issues, which also happen to represent Turkey’s 
hopes and challenges. On the one side, there is the fear on the part of the 
hard-line “Republicans” of Islamization and dismantling of the secularist legacy 
of Kemalism, the official ideology named after the founder of modern Turkey, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Often referred to as the secularist establishment, these 
hard-liners comprise the president, the military top brass, upper echelons 
of the bureaucracy and judiciary, some of the prominent figures of the 





-CHP). Origins of their fear can be 
traced back to the Republic’s Orientalist assessment of Islam as incompatible 
with both democracy and modernity, as well as to a number of Islamic 
upheavals in the 1920s.





-RP) government experience (1996–1997) provided hardliners with a 
pretext and with some evidence to argue once again that regardless of its 
illiberal features, secularism is inherently pro-democracy and Islamism is 
inherently authoritarian and unchangeable. Today, the maxim “once an 
Islamist always an Islamist” helps hard-liners maintain their suspicion of the 
AKP. On the other side, the AKP signifies the possibility of a reconciliation of 
Islam with secularism and democracy, thus arguably becoming a model for the 
rest of the Muslim world.
Those hopeful for such a reconciliation reject essentialist approaches to 
both secularism and Islamism, recognize the possibility of the transformation 
of Islamism and make a rather positive assessment of the capacities of new 
“Islamism” to liberalize the polity on the basis of the AKP’s agenda and 































business world, liberal members of the intelligentsia, Islamic identity and most 
of the deprived parts of society. Some international circles have also expressed 





Currently, the optimist tendency seems to be prevailing, because the AKP 
government has been able to put on a hope-injecting performance in almost 
all respects. Since November 2002, the economy has been stabilized, the 
inflation rate is steadily decreasing, the process of integration with the EU has 
been accelerated, and, after having sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen 
Criteria, accession negotiations with the EU began on October 3, 2005. Public 
broadcasting in Kurdish, teaching the Kurdish language in private language 
schools, and changing the composition and profile of the military-dominated 
National Security Council, which once set the parameters of civilian policy 
making, were some of the democratizing and civilianizing reforms introduced 
by the AKP. Policies to reform Turkey’s outdated education and administrative 
systems as well are on the agenda of the AKP. Moreover, the AKP has managed 
to alter Turkey’s traditionally status-quo oriented stance on the divided island 
of Cyprus and has taken some genuine steps towards its unification in 
accordance with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s plan. Some, like EU 
Commissioner Gunter Verheugen, referred to speedy reforms under the AKP 





 The AKP, therefore, seems to have initiated a process that will 
probably end “politics as we know it” in Turkey.
This article addresses the questions why and how the AKP, despite being 
damned by the secularist establishment for being born with the original sin of 
Islamism, was able to expand the political sphere and initiate a process of 
liberalization in Turkey. Since Turkey’s political structures traditionally restrict 
the domain of civilian policy-making and strip the elected governments of 




 the AKP’s overwhelming 
majority in the parliament alone cannot provide a sufficient answer to the 
question. We, therefore, take a broader view and discuss two main issues: 
the predicament of Kemalism as the foundational ideology of the Republic and 
the transformation of Islamism in Turkey as reflected in the AKP. The latter 
will entail a comparative study of the RP and the AKP in terms of (1) the 
place of Islam in the discourse of the parties; (2) attitudes of the parties 




 Kemalism, secularism 
and democracy; and (3) styles of their politics with special reference to 
relations with the broader society, the constituency and the rank-and-file of 
the parties. The article will conclude with a critical evaluation of the capacities 


























Largely due to its own undoing, Kemalism today is associated with 
conservatism and has lost the ability to resonate with the people, except as 
a shield for secularism against an apparent Islamic threat. But, since the AKP 
does not pursue an Islamist agenda, the secularist establishment’s suspicion 
based scare-mongering seems ungrounded. The AKP did not challenge the 
secularist establishment outright by constructing an alternative democratizing 
ideology. Instead, it has found a safe haven in de-emphasizing ideology 
and in engaging with Kemalism on its own terms by pursuing Turkey’s 
“above-politics” EU membership project. The strategy of democratization via 
Europeanization, however, is precarious in the long run and poses challenges 
to the AKP itself.
 
The Predicament of Kemalism as a State-Centered 
Paradigm
 
Since the 1920s, the development of modern Turkey has rested on 





 By moralizing a pre-politically defined notion of 
common good as the center on which society is supposedly united, Kemalism 
denies what politics pre-supposes, i.e., identity and interest differences, and 
confuses unity with uniformity/homogeneity. It therefore cannot see politics as 
an integrative societal activity of identity and interest differences; since politics 
is by definition an activity of differences, it keeps an eye on the political sphere 
so as to control the polity while purporting to “modernize” it. To the extent 
that the development of a healthy civil society and democratic civility is 





 Kemalism today can be considered as a hindrance to 
democracy.
There are interrelated external and internal reasons for the predicament of 
Kemalism. Externally speaking, furthering modernization and maintaining the 
state-centered Kemalist paradigm is no longer possible. This is because the 
state-centered top-down understanding of modernization has been taken over 
by the self-generation of society, the facilitating role of exogenous factors, 
democratization and the market in the contemporary age of globalization. 
If the external forces are the essential cause and catalyst of political 
modernization, and if “political modernity” is about the greater “adaptive 




 then the Kemalist state is 
expected to adapt to the new society-centered modernizing trends so as not 
to become a conservative anti-modernization force. Indeed, since the 
recognition of Turkey’s candidate status by the EU at the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit, it is less and less possible to reconcile the state-centered and 































zenith of Turkish Westernization, necessitates a democratic-liberal 
transformation of the Kemalist state-society relationship.
Internally, the social transformations especially since the mid-1980s, 





But because of its “anti-political” nature, which does not allow for political 
reexamination and redefinition of such fundamental issues as the nature of 
secularism and national identity, the Kemalist paradigm inhibits redefinition of 
the center. Moreover, the restricted political sphere in Turkey has turned 
politics into a vocation of distributing spoils through patronage networks and 
of striking a delicate balance between the state ideology and societal demands 




 As the sources of patronage have shrunk due to 
neo-liberal economic policies and economic crises in the post-1980 period, 
centrist parties are faced with an identity crisis and have lost their ability to 




 The rise of the 





-DYP) in June 1996 can be better comprehended 
against the background of the failure of Turkey’s political system to build a 
dynamic societal consensus that would embrace the newly emerging economic 
and intellectual counter-elite, deprived people in urban and rural sectors of 




The Undoing of the 28 February Process
 
The foundation of the Islamist RP-led coalition government prompted the 
secularist military to embark upon a project, usually referred to as “the 28 
February [1997] process,” after the meeting of the military dominated National 
Security Council on that date. In the actual meeting a list of measures was 
handed down to the government to fight against the creeping Islamist threat. 
The measures included the closing down of secondary-level religious schools, 
which the government could not implement. Subsequent political tension 
generated by the military in tandem with the secularist sectors of society 
resulted in the resignation of the government. The military’s project, however, 
continued, for it was also aiming at redesigning Turkey’s political landscape to 
restore the Kemalist-secularist political center without actually taking over.
By turning the protection of secularism into a top priority security issue, 
and by accusing civilian politics of undermining it, “the 28 February process” 
has made the primary function of politics to implement the security measures 
formulated by the military rather than societal representation. At a time when 
political activity was geared to the security needs of the state, it was being 
responsive and responsible to “the state” rather than the people, which 
allowed the three party coalition government (May 1999–November 2002) led 

























inability to run the prime ministry due to his ailing health. This resulted in 
further disillusionment and disenchantment of the people with the 
performance and the practice of the centrist parties, which by 2002 were 















MHP). The DYP was already vetoed for forming a coalition with the RP, 










In the run up to the November 2002 elections, while the secularist 




 the centrist 
parties distinguished themselves from the AKP by emphasizing their state-
friendly characteristics. They primarily campaigned on a platform presenting a 





Such a strategy proved to be ineffective not only because of its failure to 
address the demands and hopes of the people, but also because the AKP as 
the least state-friendly party did not have an Islamist platform. The AKP rather 
sent moderate, conciliatory and reformist messages by campaigning on a 




 promising to prioritize the material 
problems of the people rather than military-defined security threats. Hence, 
the AKP won 363 of 550 seats in the parliament with 34.2% of the votes. Of 
the 17 other parties competing in the elections, only the CHP passed the 10% 
threshold and gained 178 seats in the parliament with 19.4% of the votes. In 
this respect, it could be said that while clearly stating that an RP-like party is 
unable to survive in power, the 28 February process has eventually failed to 
achieve its original political design, aggravated the identity crisis of the 
established parties and provided the AKP with a political vacuum to fill.
 
The Transformation of Islamism from the RP to 
the AKP
 
By closing the RP and banning Necmettin Erbakan, the founding father 
of political Islam in Turkey, the 28 February process has also triggered the 
division of political Islam into the reformist and traditionalist factions. The RP’s 
successor FP was an arena of struggle between these two factions. Although 
the FP employed a pro-EU and pro-human rights discourse, the traditionalists’ 
turn to democracy and to the EU did not involve any self-criticism and was 
designed only to demonstrate the undemocratic practices of the 28 February 
process against the RP. For the traditionalist faction, removing the ban imposed 
on Erbakan held priority over endorsing a broad agenda for democratization 































generation, on the other hand, favored an Islam-sensitive, rather than Islamist, 
political stance and employed a more comprehensive and consistent language 
of democracy and human rights. In this way, they hoped to be able to fill the 
political vacuum created by the 28 February process, to make inroads into 
Turkey’s power structure and to better represent the interests of Islamic 
identity without risking their own political survival. Once the FP was closed, 
the reformists founded the AKP in August 2001 and took the helm only fifteen 




-SP), founded in 
July 2001, represented a softer version of RP-style Islamism and has received 
only 2.5% of the votes in the 2002 elections. In what follows, we will delineate 
some major aspects of this division by comparing and contrasting the RP and 
the AKP. The FP is left out of this comparison so as to better see the magnitude 




The Place of Islam: From Religion to Politics
 
The RP’s prescriptions for solving problems, its narration of history and 





 It saw history as a clash between “just” religious and “unjust” secular 
civilizations. The West, whose fundamental characteristic was said to be 
oppression against Muslims, represented the latter. In the RP’s analysis, 
the decline of Muslim civilization (the Ottoman Empire), was due to the 
degenerating impact of Westernization reforms since the Tanzimat (1839), 
which allegedly introduced “the sickness of materialism” to Turkish society. Its 
cure was to eradicate Westernism through a process of moral development, 




 In this way, the RP 
believed, economic development can be achieved, material problems can be 
resolved and an orderly society of virtuous/religious people can be built. 
Moreover, a “morally developed” Turkey could lead the Muslim world in the 
revitalization of Islamic civilization and in the formation of an Islamic 
international bloc against the West. Naturally, the RP was an anti-Western and 
anti-EU political party, categorizing itself as the spearhead of the “religious” in 





 In its struggle to revitalize the Islamic civilization, the RP equated 
itself with Islam, portrayed all prophets as its predecessors and all its followers 





By contrast, as an outcome of the conclusions they have drawn from the 





 The leading figures of the AKP make a distinction between a 
political party and religion party, which they associate with the RP. Defining 

























peculiarity of the ideological politics of the bi-polar Cold War era. The 
polarizing, excluding and conflictual tendencies of ideological politics or a 
religion party, the AKP believe, are rendered ineffective by the globalization 
process, which necessitates participatory, non-discriminating, conciliatory and 
pluralist political approaches that pay special attention to the protection of 




 Unlike the RP, AKP does not equate globalization 
with Western imperialism, but considers it as the changing context of politics 
to which Turkey should adapt by way of accelerating its integration with the 
EU. As a party aiming to be in harmony with the global trends, the AKP claims 
to be a non-ideological, non-Islamist 
 
political party aiming to serve the people 
in general but not restricting its horizon to religious issues or religious people 
only.22 “Using religion for political purposes, turning religion into a tool, 
adopting an exclusionary approach in the name of religion,” Erdogan 
maintains, “harms societal peace, political pluralism and religion itself.”23
The AKP recognizes such problems of Islamic identity as the restrictions 
on wearing the headscarf, but in addressing them it pays attention to two 
principles so as not to appear to be a religion party. First, it abstains from an 
exclusive focus on religious issues in order not to be accused of “abusing 
religion for political purposes” or of aiming to serve the particular interests of 
the religious people only. In this way, the AKP hopes to avoid the curse of 
the secularist establishment and fulfill the criteria it has set for being a 
non-ideological political party. Second, the AKP employs a conciliatory and 
moderate approach in aiming to solve the problems of Islamic identity through 
a consensus with the secularist establishment. Without such a consensus, 
the AKP fears, any attempt at redefining secularism may facilitate further 
crackdown on Islamic identity, as happened in the 28 February Process.24
Adversarial Agendas: From Islamizing to Right-Sizing
On the basis of its non-Islamist agenda, it is sometimes said that the AKP 
is allowed to rule because it is not as adversarial towards the state as the RP 
was. However, a close comparison of the parties’ attitudes towards the state 
shows that it is not the degree but the angle of the adversary that differentiates 
the parties.
For the RP, Republican secularism was the crux of all problems as it 
imprisoned religion into the conscience of the people and thereby prevented 
their moral development, which was seen as the prerequisite of all good 
things.25 The problem with republican secularism, in turn, was actually the 
Westernizing elite, which encompassed the rest of the political class and which 
oppressed the uniformly Muslim Turkish people in alliance with Western and 
Zionist forces by using the machinery of the state.26 Thereby, the RP 
disregarded the heterogeneous nature of society and refrained from a genuine 
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consensus-building, compromising only tactically when the exigencies of 
power-seeking required. Here the RP’s approach was Kemalist at least in two 
respects. First, in seeking a panacea in the replacement of the alienated elite 
with its pious cadres, the RP neglected/downplayed the importance of the 
Kemalist state-society relationship. Ultimately, the RP’s stance vis-a-vis the 
state/power structure was institutionally conservative in the sense of 
maintaining state-centered structures. Second, the RP’s institutional 
conservatism was functional not just for integrating its own constituency into 
the well-established patronage network, but also for the realization of its own 
project of “moral development” in a top-down fashion. Accordingly, if the 
Republican elite controlled religion to limit its role, the RP would also maintain 
this control to expand the role of religion and encourage religiosity. Hence, 
a number of Islamization proposals, such as making Friday a holiday, were 
defended in terms of the state’s duty to provide religious services.
Compared to the RP’s institutionally conservative, personalistic and 
power-seeking approach, the AKP problematizes the non-pluralist and illiberal 
form of secularism and state-society relationship. The AKP, too, is critical of 
the current practice of secularism in Turkey because it discriminates against 
religious people and inhibits religious freedoms.27 However, the AKP’s 
alternative to the current practice of secularism is not a top-down Islamization 
as the RP’s was. The AKP conceives and frames secularism as a matter of 
democratization/liberalization and wants it to be conceived as such so that 
consensus between the parties can be achieved.28 For the AKP the choice is 
not between Islam and the West or between alienated elite and its pious 
contenders. The choice for the AKP is between old and new understandings 
of modernization. In this respect, Kemalism is the catalyst of the AKP’s political 
identity, defined primarily in anti-social engineering terms. The old 
understanding of modernization as cultural shift, the AKP maintains, resulted 
in a bureaucratic-statist form of state society relationship that keeps the 
domains of state intervention quite large. Currently, such a relationship hinders 
societal dynamism, economic development and further modernization because 
it does not set society free from the conservative grip of the state.29 Altering 
the top-down, bureaucratic-statist structures by redistributing political power is 
the panacea offered by the AKP: correcting the error of “big state” will deliver 
all good things in a smooth process. While the RP aimed at remaking society 
by maintaining the state centered structures under the control of its pious 
cadres, the AKP aims at remaking the state by restricting its domains of control 
and intervention in accordance with global trends. In defending its state 
project, the AKP takes pride in Turkish society’s dynamism and adaptive 
capacities, which in essence runs contrary to the Kemalist distrust of society. 
It is important to note also that AKP’s reform proposals towards 
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deconcentration of political power aims at externalizing such political 
responsibilities as balanced regional development in accordance with the 
global trends.30
Political Styles: Misrepresentation vs. Silent 
Representation of Islamic Identity
Because the RP was so self-obsessed with its own ‘truth,’ there was a 
disjuncture between the RP and its electoral base. The RP was, therefore, 
unable to sustain its legitimacy. The AKP on the other hand is more susceptible 
to societal signals, enabling it to be responsive, to maintain legitimacy and to 
undermine the secularist establishment’s suspicion-based strategy of 
opposition.
It is possible to suggest that the RP pursued an agenda independent of 
the concerns of its own support base and clashed not only with the military, 
but also with large sectors of society. Underlying these was the RP’s 
conceptualization of politics as a mechanism for serving religion and the 
consequent absolutist claim to represent ‘the truth.’ Following the Qur’anic 
principle “the Truth has come and the Wrong has become null,” the RP claimed 
to represent the Truth. This claim inevitably involved the dismissal of all the 
rest of the political class as “discotheque boys,” aiming at unification with the 
infidels and severing links with Islam.31 But more importantly, the RP judged 
all those sectors of society not conforming to its conceptualization of Muslim 
Turk as having a false state of consciousness. Rescuing them from their alleged 
moral crisis or state of false-consciousness, according to Erbakan, was a 
religious act of tenderness/care (sefkat) with enormous rewards in the 
hereafter.32 Hence, the failure of the RP to recognize society as it is and the 
perception of the RP as a threat to secular life-styles.
The absolutist, monopolizing and top-down pattern of relationship with 
society was also valid for the RP’s intra-party organization and relations with 
the Islamic constituency. Erbakan and a handful of his stalwarts, often referred 
to as the politburo, have monopolized the formulation of the party’s policies 
and demanded unconditional obedience from the rank-and-file of the party as 
well as from the younger generation of its top figures. This gave way to an 
extremely hierarchical organization that did not allow any (self) criticism.33 
The premium value in organizational terms was “unity” as reflected in 
unquestioned loyalty to hierarchical superiors and ultimately to the leader. 
Only in this way, it was believed, could the mission be pursued better. 
Consequently, no input was expected in the formulation of policies from the 
constituency or society at large. “In our culture,” one of the close associates of 
Erbakan, Oguzhan Asilturk, stated “there is no place for criticism. If one is not 
authorized to reach the good, then she/he is to help those who are authorized 
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to reach the good.”34 As such, the need for political accountability for the RP 
was less pressing than it seemed for a political party. This resulted in room 
for maneuver and flexibility, while serving religion and pursuing the ‘truth.’ 
Coupled with the portrayal of its struggle as a war, exigencies of which 
necessitated deception, censorship and self-censorship,35 the RP was able to 
make significant u-turns in its pursuit of power, and yet claim to be truthful 
to its mission. Eventually, however, the RP appeared to be treating Islamic 
identity solely as a “mobilizational tool” for power-seeking purposes.36 
Moreover, the political agenda that the RP pursued seemed to be grounded in 
its own fictitious truth and independent of the hopes and demands of the 
people. There was therefore a disjuncture between the RP and its societal base.
Pointing to the failure of the RP style Islamism, Erdogan stated that they 
aim to show how successfully religious people will make politics.37 To this 
end, the AKP disassociates itself from religion, except the piety of its individual 
members; refrains from attacking the principle of secularism; and embraces 
democracy as an antidote of illiberal secularism. They represent Islamic 
identity mostly by their silent piety and by expressing their demands every 
once in a while. One of the prominent figures of the AKP, Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gul, explained that conservative people can only be attractive to the 
electorate if they are modern (cagdas), and that they can only be modern 
if they are democratic.38 In sharp contrast to the RP, the AKP rejects the 
possibility of a non-negotiable absolute truth in a democratic regime and 
recognizes the necessity of dialogue, compromise and consensus for a 
democratic rule.39 Consequently, the AKP’s relationship with society is less 
conflictual and exclusionary than that of the RP. Moreover, the AKP’s 
understanding of democratic legitimacy seems to go beyond an electoral and 
majority-rule understanding of democracy and includes such fundamentals as 
the rule of law and inalienable rights and liberties. As such, the AKP recognizes 
that democratic legitimacy needs to be constantly reproduced in the actions 
and policies of a political party. The AKP therefore is more susceptible to 
societal signals and aims at gaining the trust of the people as opposed to the 
RP’s aim of molding them with an Islamic identity in a top-down manner.
Contrary to the RP, the AKP does not have a missionary zeal. It sees politics 
primarily as a mechanism for reconciling differences and serving the people, 
and as an art of solving problems.40 Negotiation, discussion and compromise 
are the key elements of such a pragmatist political activity. Most importantly, 
as a result of the conclusions they have drawn from the 28 February process, 
the leaders of the AKP emphasize the importance of realism in politics. In 
sharp contrast to unworkable idealizations of the RP, which resulted in a kind 
of romanticism, the AKP defects from pursuing a pre-politically defined divine 
mission and holds itself responsible for representing and serving the people, 
T’ T U  AKP R
479
which in turn necessitates taking into account the social and political realities 
of Turkey. Without taking into account such realities as the concerns and 
power of the military or the plurality of Islam in society, the AKP believes, the 
risk of creating political tension is high. As the 28 February process’ crackdown 
on Islamic identity has shown, political tension serves no one. Moreover, as a 
political party, the AKP leaders argue, they have to think about society in 
general and should not sacrifice its prosperity and stability for the sake of 
pursuing Islamic issues only. Hence, after a number of attempts, it has once 
again become clear that conditions for a new consensus on secularism are not 
yet ripe. The AKP has withdrawn its proposals on removing the restrictions on 
wearing headscarf.
Despite its initial promises for intra-party democracy and teamwork, the 
AKP is a centrist leadership party. While promoting the party as a brand, 
Erdogan, as Erbakan did, undermines the autonomy of party members and 
parliamentarians and concentrates power in his hands at the party 
headquarters.41 In addition to Erdogan’s patronizing style, one of the motives 
here seems to be the fear of losing control and becoming an outlet for 
excessive Islamist demands of the former RP members in the rank-and-file. 
Another motive is to mold the party’s identity along the lines of “conservative 
democracy.” This still in-the-making identity thus far has served to distinguish 
the AKP from the RP-style Islamism, while at the same time indicating that 
issues related to Islamic identity are still a concern for the AKP. Nevertheless, 
one can also talk about an ongoing process of remolding Islamic identity in 
another, less parochial, direction. An illustration of this process is Erdogan’s 
response to secularist Bulent Ecevit’s fear that “Turkey may lose its religion, 
and thereby risk its unity” as a result of increasing Christian missionary 
activities. In a speech he delivered at the First Congress of the Women Branch 
of the AKP’s Trabzon provincial organization, Erdogan addressed Ecevit’s 
concerns in an unexpectedly progressive manner for a former Islamist: “If 
there are mosques in Germany, France and other European countries, then we 
have to reciprocate with them. If one trusts one’s religion, one will not fear 
losing it.”42 That the AKP has a transforming impact on Islamic identity is also 
illustrated by the findings of a nation-wide survey published in July 2004.43 The 
results of this research have shown that among the conservative-nationalist 
sectors of society, supporters of the AKP are the least anti-EU.
The Rule of the AKP
In light of the above discussion, it is not the principle of secularism, unless 
one equates it with a sterilized and monist public sphere, but the state-
centered legacy of Kemalism that is under threat. The AKP is accused of having 
a hidden Islamist agenda and of being reactionary mainly for two reasons, 
T M W • V 96 • J 2006
480
both of which reveal the poverty of Kemalist opposition as it stands. First, 
the AKP’s Islamist pedigree, but not its concrete policy proposals, provides 
the “evidence” for its hidden reactionary agenda. Here, the method of 
the secularist establishment for gathering evidence is mind-reading. For the 
opposition CHP, the AKP needs to be checked, balanced and guided more 
than any other government because of its Islamist origins.44 This distrust of 
the AKP results in a political debate centered only on the question of who 
proposes policies. For example, although it was on its agenda as well, the CHP 
finds it suspicious and rejects the AKP’s call for cooperation in preparing a new 
constitution that would replace the 1982 Constitution, promulgated by the 
coup administration.45
Secondly, the link established between state-centricism and regime 
stability, and the underlying assumption of an inevitable retreat into the Islamic 
roots if the grip of state over the society loosens, seems to be a determining 
factor in the opposition against the AKP. Such an opposition in effect 
perpetuates the Kemalist distrust of society and upholds the current state 
structure, which is known for its failures and ineffectiveness. Moreover, if 
Orientalism means questioning the capacities of Muslim societies to achieve 
democracy, the Turkish opposition reproduces Orientalist assumptions and 
runs the risk of being an opposition to democratization and the establishment 
of the rule of law. An illustration is the military’s accusation that the AKP’s 
dissension to the High Military Council decisions to purge allegedly Islamist 
officers encourages Islamic reactionism. The dissent of the AKP, however, also 
springs from the immunity of the decisions from judicial review, which violates 
the basic principle of a constitutional state- all acts of administration should be 
subject to appeal in courts.
The EU Leverage
On the one hand, the AKP’s non-Islamist, pro-democracy and pro-EU 
political stance makes the secularist scare-mongering less effective. On the 
other hand, the societal current that brought the AKP to power represents a 
broad-based demand for further democratic reform.46 Yet, while helpful, none 
of these would have sufficed to overcome the conservative resistance of the 
establishment if Turkey did not have its Europeanization project, which 
signifies the fulfilling of the Kemalist goal of Westernization. Once it took the 
helm, the AKP defined itself as the agency for executing agency the original 
Kemalist project of “reaching the level of contemporary civilizations.” The 
crystallization of civilization, according to the AKP, was the EU, and the two 
distinguishing features of being civilized were economic well-being and 
democracy with guaranteed basic rights and liberties, including the right to 
wear the headscarf in educational institutions.47 The process of integration with 
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the EU, according to the AKP, necessitated the alteration of the state-centered 
Kemalist paradigm and the redefinition of democracy in such a way that 
inalienable rights, pluralism and non-electoral participation (of civil society 
organizations) are institutionalized.48 In fact, all the reforms AKP has 
introduced were made within the framework of fulfilling the Copenhagen 
Criteria, a precondition for the start of accession negotiations with the EU. 
Hence, by adopting the pillar principle of Kemalism in a modified way, the 
AKP combined reformism with a de-emphasis on political ideology and 
conflict, overcame the conservative and immobilizing opposition, and initiated 
a process of altering the Kemalist paradigm without clashing with its guardians 
directly.
The above-politics status of the EU membership project meant that no 
party posed an outright force of opposition to it. The general attitude of the 
state-friendly parties towards the EU has been to follow the footsteps of the 
secularist establishment, which on the pretext of Turkey’s unique conditions, 
apologetically asks for exceptions to and concessions from the criteria 
of membership without abandoning the project of EU membership. This 
approach practically prefers a democracy customized to the Turkish context 
and discordant with such international standards as rule of law, accountability 
and limited state. The AKP, on the other hand, rejects tutelary democracy on 
the grounds that Turkish society is mature enough for a democracy that fulfils 
universal standards.49 “Our fundamental objective” Abdullah Gul declared, 
“is to transform Turkey into a fully functioning European democracy.”50 
Underlying the AKP’s strong political will behind the Europeanization project 
is that “the only way for this party to survive in power and endure is through 
a liberal transformation of the Turkish polity and its civilization.”51
The impact of the AKP’s resolve in pursuing democratization via 
Europeanization has been the revelation of the conservative nature of 
Kemalism and the state-friendly political parties and consequently a change of 
positions in the political spectrum. Immediately after the recognition of 
Turkey’s EU-candidate status in 1999, some guardians of Kemalism joined the 
Islamist camp by declaring the EU a “Christian Club” undermining the secular 
and unitarian regime in Turkey.52 Underlying this isolationist response is an 
obsession with protecting the achievements of the Republic by curbing and 
controlling societal dynamics, which, as retired General Salim Dervisoglu 
recently admitted, is conservative in essence for it relegates the furthering 
of modernization to a secondary place.53 The CHP’s “leftist” opposition too 
accuses the AKP of undermining Turkey’s secularist unitarian regime and 
of abusing the EU project for its own political ends by doing too much to 
realize it.54 The opposition mostly claims that the AKP is making up for its 
domestic legitimacy deficit by allying with external forces that undermine 
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“our national unity and interests.” A natural consequence of this Third-Worldist 
adversary, which neglects the internal dynamics of Turkish society, is resorting 
to conspiracy theories to explain Turkish politics.55
Limits to Turkey’s Transformation under AKP Rule
In the absence of an opposition that gives effective expression to the 
language of democratization and that would help the AKP and Turkish society 
further habituate the norms and values of democracy, the risks of having a 
shallow democracy is high for two main reasons. First, the bounty of full 
membership in the EU appears as the sole driving force of democratization in 
Turkey. Yet, at the 17 December 2005 Summit, while opening the negotiations, 
the EU as whole was unable to support Turkey’s full membership perspective 
with a strong political will. That the future of the EU Constitution after the 
French and Dutch referenda is uncertain means a shift of priorities away from 
the integration of economically backward and populous Turkey. In addition, 
essentialist biases of some top European policy makers also play a role in the 
EU’s inability to form a strong political will in favor of Turkey’s membership. 
For example, the French Prime Minister Jean Marie Raffarain expressed his 
doubts about Muslim Turkish society’s capacity to embrace European human 
rights values.56 As the possibility of other options than full membership, such 
as “privileged partnership” is now mentioned in the official EU documents, the 
momentum of Turkey’s Europeanization may face a setback.
Secondly, the Europeanization project poses some challenges to its sole 
political contractor, the AKP itself. One difficulty for the AKP to maintain its 
resolve in Europeanization springs from the crucial issue of the illiberal 
practice of secularism. The approval of the ban on wearing the headscarf on 
university premises by the European Court of Human Rights and the silence of 
the Progress Reports concerning the rights and liberties of Islamic identity have 
alienated the Islamic identity from the EU and stripped the AKP of the means 
to redefine secularism as a matter of democracy and pluralism. As it stands, in 
the pluralist public sphere envisioned by the EU, there is no room for the 
representation of Islamic identity.
Another difficulty for the AKP to pursue Turkey’s Europeanization springs 
from its restricted understanding of democracy. The AKP restricts the relation 
of power, and thus the project of democratization, to the relation between 
elected representatives of the people and the non-elected state elite in the 
political sphere.57 It thereby neglects the societal aspects of democratization. 
As can be seen in the EU’s October 2004 and November 2005 progress reports, 
which call for public representation of such societal differences as Turkish 
Alevis, Kurds, Armenians, Greek Orthodox and so on, substantive democratization 
has a society-related aspect as well. Since the AKP’s conservative democratic 
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approach conceptualizes society as a harmonious unity of differences and 
as lacking power relations between, for example, Kurds and Turks, men and 
women, labor and capital and so on, the AKP argues against the representation 
and politicization of societal differences, while recognizing the existence of 
them. “Bringing our differences to a political level,” Erdogan claims, “will be 
the biggest damage one can make to this country.”58 One exception here is 
the rights and liberties of Islamic identity. Erdogan criticizes the monist 
conceptualization of the public sphere for being closed to societal differences 
and for inhibiting freedoms only when it comes to the ban on wearing the 
headscarf on university premises.59 The normative bias and the failure of the 
AKP to flatly employ a pluralist-liberalizing discourse can further be seen in its 
failed attempt to criminalize adultery in autumn 2004. By categorizing the issue 
of adultery as a matter of morality and by aiming to criminalize it, Erdogan has 
clearly shown that there are conservative exceptions to the principle of 
restricting the domains of state intervention.
This is not to deny that the AKP endorses democracy, but to indicate that 
if it is to push for further democratization in Turkey, its concept of democracy 
has to go beyond the non-violent transfer of power through elections and 
its language of pluralist democracy has to embrace a broader spectrum of 
identities. This, in turn, necessitates not religious reform, but an intellectually 
grounded conceptualization of democracy and a well-defined strategy of 
democratization, because, as the historical track record of Turkish democracy 
has shown, democratic consolidation is not an inevitable outcome of 
pragmatic political competition for power.60 Yet, while upholding 
democratization as a top priority issue, AKP leaders seem to be concerned 
with neither the concept nor the strategy of democratization.61 In the end, it is 
perhaps the AKP’s pragmatic reduction of democracy to electoral competition 
and to expansion of the domains of civilian policy-making that forms one of 
the bottlenecks of democratization in Turkey.
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